The parsha starts with parshas bikurim and then continues with bi’ur maasros. Both require a declaration. Bikkurim has the declaration of “arami oved avi” and bi’ur maasros has the declaration of “bi’arti hakodesh min habayis.” These are very different declarations. Bikkurim is a shevach to Hashem for saving us and giving us the land and the produce. Bi’ur maasros is a declaration of how we’ve fulfilled our obligations to give maasros. Very different, and yet Chazal tag both of them with the name Vidui. The term vidui is familiar to us from vidui chata’im, confessing our sins, but what does vidui have to do with praising Hashem and fulfilling our obligations? And usually vidui is for confessing you’ve done something wrong, yet here, just the opposite – I’m patting myself on the back for doing everything right – “asisi c’asher tzivisani!” So why are we calling these vidui?

This is not the only place Chazal lump two disparate ideas together under the same “vidui” title.

1. The Medrash says that Adam Harishon said “Tov l’hodos LaHashem” after learning of the power of Vidui. What does Vidui and l’hodos have to do with each other? “l’hodos” is thanking Hashem, and vidui is confession of sin. What’s the connection?

2. The Gemara says that when Hashem told Moshe about vidui on Korbanos, that inspired Moshe to say “mizmor l’soda.” Again, mizmor l’soda is a praise of Hashem, thanking Him. What does that have to do with vidui, confession of sins?

3. Also, Chazal say because Leah said Hoda’ah to Hashem, that’s why Yehuda is “hodeh, v’lo bosh.” Again, Chazal are linking confession and hoda’ah. What’s the connection?

To explain, let’s start with what Chazal say about Hoda’ah.

Chazal say “from the time of creation there was no person who thanked Hashem until Leah came and thanked Him” when she said “הפעם אודה את ה.” How’s that possible? The Avos didn’t praise Hashem? Avraham avinu? Yitzchak and Yaakov avinu? Never praised Hashem? What do Chazal mean that Leah was the first?

The answer is that Hoda’ah is not just praise or a conventional “thank you.” It’s a recognition that I have no right or claim to that which you have given me.

L’mashal: If I do someone a favor, and I don’t charge them for it, but they come back to me and give me a gift and say thank you – I certainly have no legal claim to say they owed me the gift, but there’s a small claim I can make internally that I deserve the gift. It’s not a legal payment, but there was some aspect of that gift that wasn’t 100% a gift, but a tiny degree of repayment for my favor. I have gratitude, but it’s not a full measure of hoda’ah.

But if someone gives me a gift out of the blue, and I did absolutely nothing to deserve it, then there’s no sense of “this is mine,” or “this is due to me,” but rather the opposite, “it’s not mine, it’s yours!” I have something of yours in my possession. That is Hoda’ah.

Just like Hoda’as Bal Din. I am admitting I have something of yours in my possession, I have no claim to it.

Leah imeinu was the first to give Hoda’ah. To everyone else the goodness HKBH sent them could be viewed as a tiny degree of schar, or repayment for their avodah. Even though the Avos clearly recognized everything is from Hashem, but there could be a tiny sense that it’s was earned due to their avodah.

Even Leah imeinu didn’t say Hoda’ah by her first three kids. It was only the 4th child that triggered hoda’ah. The reason is there was a sense of entitlement that each of Yaakov’s wives would have three children, an equal share of the 12 shvatim. When Leah had her 4th child it was recognized as this is beyond my due share – there was no sense of entitlement – and that is when true Hoda’ah is recognized.

Let’s plug this into vidui chata’im.

When we look at the steps of tshuva – charata, azivas ha’chet, vidui – we feel vidui is the easiest part. Just simply say a few words. The hard stuff – charata, azivas ha’chet – that requires real avodas halev, those must be the ikkar parts of teshuva. However, when you look at hilchos teshuva in the Rambam, the main emphasis is on vidui. Why?

When a person does an aveira and wants to avoid guilt, they can deny it. But if they got caught, they will still try to wiggle out of it with excuses of why they were justified.

L’mashal: If you are in your own house and making noise, and your neighbor knocks on your door to complain you’re being too loud – you feel bad, but there’s a part of you that says that you’re not 100% wrong. You have your right to make noise, they have their right to peace and quiet – why should their rights trump yours?

But lets say you’re a guest in someone else’s house, then all the sudden every little misstep is full of apologies. “Sorry if I made too much noise, sorry if I didn’t tidy up, sorry if I was in your way.” Why are you full of apologies? Do you act worse as a guest than you do in your own home? Mistama you act better! So why are you full of apologies? The answer is that as a guest you realize “I have no claim, no rights to do anything. Everything was a gift, granted to me from the ba’al haBayis.”

That’s the challenge of vidui. We’re not denying we did an aveira, that’s silly. The real challenge is saying I’m not the baal habayis where I can determine what I can and cannot do. Deep down, every person wants to be the ba’al HaBayis over their rights and obligations. To say I have no say over my rights, I have no ba’alus to justify what I did – Hashem determines what I can and cannot do in every aspect of my existence – that’s crux of vidui.

Every vidui is moving you from the sense that you have rights and ba’alus to a recognition you don’t!

Let’s return to our questions:

1. What is the relationship between vidui and hoda’ah? The answer is both are the person’s declaration that I’m not the ba’al in this arena, and anything I have is from Hashem.

   The Omek of lashon hakodesh is incredible! Vidui and Hoda’ah have the same shoresh – Yud, daled, Heh. The action of the word Yud, Daled, Heh is either L’Hodos or L’Hisvados. They’re both the same declaration that what you have is another’s and not yours. You can express it in different directions, either outward toward the other, or inward toward yourself. When it’s the outward expression then it’s l’hodos. When it’s the inward, reflexive, expression it’s l’hisvados. But it’s the same declaration that you’re not the ba’alim.

2. We asked how can we call vidui maasros a vidui when we’re patting ourselves on the back for doing everything right? The answer is vidui is not just what you did wrong. It’s a declaration of your ownership – or rather lack of ownership – of the fruit of your labor. By your labor there’s a strong sense of “this is mine.” Even when you give it away there’s a sense of “I’ll give a portion of my stuff to tzedakah.”

   L'mashal: When giving tzedakah, there’s the amount you give willingly, and if they ask for more, there’s the amount that you are okay extending yourself to, but when they keep asking you get upset. “It’s not your money, it’s my money. I’m already giving, I’m already going lifnim m’shuras haDin. I have a right to keep something for myself, don’t I? What right do they have to demand this from me?”

   These perspectives are off the mark. If you view tzedaka as lifnim m’shuras hadin – that sentiment is a hafka’ah of vidui. Vidui is the recognition that that what you have is not an entitlement. It was kol koolo a matana from Hashem. “Lecha Hashem Hagedula, Hagevurah, ki CHOL bashamyim u’va’aretz! I have no right to it, it’s all Yours!

L’inyaneinu: That which you’ve been doing from birth, there’s no resistance, it comes easy. Like getting dressed in the morning, or eating with a fork and knife. That’s not our struggle for avodah.

But when you become a ben-aliya, you’re going past your current zone, that’s when the struggle of Avodah kicks in. And the struggle is not necessarily doing the motions, and overcoming laziness, or overcoming ta’avah. The struggle is deeper than that. Deep down there’s an unwillingness to do Avodas Hashem because you want a space that’s yours, where you’re the ba’al habayis, where Hashem can’t make His demands.

And we hear HKBH’s demands. He wants the morning for davening, He wants the day for Talmud torah, He wants the money for chessed, He wants the ta’avos for kedusha. Every single thing? Let me live a life!

And we know He wants it all: “lo pasak puma m’girsa” “אִם יִתֵּן אִישׁ אֶת כָּל הוֹן בֵּיתוֹ בָּאַהֲבָה בּוֹז יָבוּזוּ לוֹ Everything? Give me at least my own daled amos! When Adam sinned he hid from Hashem, not that he thought Hashem couldn’t see him, but he just wanted a space apart from Hashem.

No one says this out loud. We think “I’ll give a little more here, a little more there, but everything? Is there nothing that I have for myself? Nothing?

True vidui only comes from a sense of hoda’ah. “ki CHOL bashamayim u’va’aretz, lecha Hashem.” That’s the avodah of this season and it’s a life’s avodah.

If you can sincerely recognize and declare that you’re not the ba’alim, but Hashem is; When you’re no longer bothered by HKBH’s demands, but aderaba, “ki heim chayeinu.” When you no longer want your own daled amos without Hashem, but aderaba, You want to be in His presence always. “Es panecha Hashem avakesh” “Modeh ani l’fanecha” Tamid. Then there’s a simcha in your vidui. Then you realize “Tov L’hodos L’Hashem.”

A Paraphrased Shiur of Rabbi Ahron Lopiansky

Parshas Nitzavim. At the very end of the parsha, as Hakadosh Baruch Hu delivers what is b'etzem the final tochacha — the last great mussar of Devarim — the Torah says:

החיים והמות נתתי לפניך הברכה והקללה ובחרת בחיים למען תחיה אתה וזרעך

Devarim 30:19

Choose life!

The Rishonim see this as the makor for the whole concept of bechira, that a person has free choice. But, if you think about it, this is a strange place for the Torah to say it. The main source that there is bechira is the entire Torah itself. It makes no sense that Hakadosh Baruch Hu should be metzaveh mitzvos and aveiros on a being that has no choice. So logically, the makor for bechira should sit at the very beginning of Torah, or maybe somewhere at Ma'amad Har Sinai. To place the whole musag of bechira at the end, is mudna.

Also, seemingly off-target: The pasuk says uvacharta bachayim — choose life. But we are really speaking about mitzvos and aveiros; the hadgasha should have been to choose mitzvos. Saying “uvacharta bachayim” is mashma that the etzem tzivuy is uvacharta bachayim itself, not chose the mitzvah over the aveira.

We have to be misbonen in bechira itself. We use it colloquially to mean “free choice,” but when it’s used in Tanach the word is used mostly about Hakadosh Baruch Hu’s choice: We speak of the Beis HaMikdash as the מקום אשר יבחר, the Beis HaBechira. We say in davening a passuk אַתָּה הוּא יְהוָה הָאֱלֹהִים אֲשֶׁר בָּחַרְתָּ בְּאַבְרָם. We say Ha’bocher b'amo Yisrael. What does it mean that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is bocher? We have bechira because we are pulled two ways, so we have to choose between two directions. But what does it mean by Hakadosh Baruch Hu? And whatever this bechira is by HKBH, since Adam is בצלם אלוקים, his koach bechira must have a tzad hashaveh to HKBH’s bechira.

The Maharal has a comment about this which is the mafte’ach. The Maharal asks a classic kasha: Why does the Torah tells us nothing of Avraham Avinu's life until Lech Lecha? One would expect the record of his ma'asim tovim, the smashing of Avoda Zara, the mesiras nefesh by the Kivshan. Instead the passukim say nothing, and then, out of nowhere, Hakadosh Baruch Hu says Lech Lecha.

The Maharal answers that, had the Torah listed Avraham’s deeds, I would have assumed Hakadosh Baruch Hu chose him because of the tzidkus of Avraham. Kamashma lan — it has nothing to do with the tzidkus. It was simply HKBH’s Bechira, without reason. That’s his teretz.

It’s hard to understand. "Without a reason" doesn’t sound like a good thing. If I ask a person why he did something and he answers, " no reason, on a whim," that seems reckless and irrational. So what does it mean that Hakadosh Baruch Hu was simply bocher b'Avraham "for no reason"?

Rav Shamshon Rafael Hirsch contrasts two words: bachar and barar. To choose and to select. They are similar, but there’s a fundamental difference. L’mahsal, the Gemara in Gittin measures a bar da'as by his koach of brera: the child who צרור וזורקו אגוז ונוטלו— he can distinguish between a pebble and a nut. Brera is the koach to be mavchin between two things and pick the better one. Which one is better? Meaning, when I am trying to accomplish something, sechel steps in and is mavchin which one helps me accomplish what I want to accomplish. I want to eat, and I choose food A over food B because it is better, or cheaper, or healthier, and so on. I want to travel to a destination, so sechel has to dan — what’s a way to get there? is there a better way? That is brera. It’s danning on the heicha timtza for me to accomplish my goals.

But before you get tangled in the world of brera, there’s a more fundamental bechira taking place: why was that goal even your goal? Before you set out on your heichi timtzas, why was your ratzon what it is? That question has zero to do with sechel. L’mashal, a sick man chooses between two doctors — that is brera. But ask him why he wants to live at all, and there is no answer in the world of brera. “I choose life over death because —” because what? It does not belong to the world of sechel. It is my atzmiyus, my ratzon, my chiyus — this is me.

If I ask “Why are you friends with Reuven?” And you answer “Because he can help me,” “or because I have hakaras hatov,” that’s a brera, heicha timtza answer that comes from sechel. But if you answer “I don't know — I just like Reuven” that answer is not coming from sechel, but it’s just grasped as pashut, “that’s who I am.” That’s a bechira.

When the Maharal says Bechira is “for no reason,” it doesn’t mean it’s whimsical. It means that I didn’t choose it as a conclusion reached by sechel, but rather it connects to my etzem mahus, my etzem ratzon.

Hakadosh Baruch Hu created a gigantic briya — mind boggling, with trillions of stars, myriad elements, and laws of physics that animate and dictate the briya. It’s all a b’chinas sechel, a tremendous heicha timtza so that the world can accomplish its goal. But within this giant world Hakadosh Baruch Hu is bocher a makom? bamakom asher yivchar – Why this makom? The answer is not going to be with klei sechel – with an argument that it’s best suited to accomplish x,y and z. HKBH’s ratzon precedes any heichi timtza. HKBH establishes His makom, and everything else calibrates and aligns with that.

There were many Tzaddikim who did good things. Noach was a tzaddik, Shem v'Ever were chashuve people who did mitzvos and HKBH gave them schar. And HKBH wants us to do mitzvos – avada, avodas Hashem manifests in the form of ma’aseh mitzvos, but underneath the ma’aseh mitzvos, there’s when the entirety of the person, the atzmius of the person aligns with HKBH’s ratzon. The person’s entire chiyus is to connect with the ratzon of HKBH. HKBH, k’b’yochol, gravitates towards such a person, because His ratzon is already abiding there. By Avraham Avinu, because לבבו נאמן לפניך — Avraham's essence was so completely animated by HKBH, that HKBH’s ratzon was already abiding with him. That’s what it means אשר בחרת באברם

What we’re describing parallels the world of lishma. The Rambam explains רצה הקדוש ברוך הוא לזכות את ישראל לפיכך הרבה להם תורה ומצוות – HKBK gave us mitzvos so that we can do one of them lishma and be zoche to Olam HaBa. Olam Haba is talu’i on lishma.

When we speak of lishmah — "for its own sake" — it’s so vague; what does that even mean? It means we’re not operating in the world of heicha timtza anymore, but instead we’re dealing in the world of atzmius. Shelo lishmah means I want the mitzvah for something entirely outside it: I do it so people should say, "oh, what a tzaddik," or even a more refined lo lishma – I do the mitzvah so that Hashem should act favorably toward me — that too casts the whole world of mitzvos into the framework of heicha timtza, of means toward a separate end. Lishma is when I’m not even considering what I’m accomplishing. It’s just pashut “ki heim chayeinu.”

It is like the difference between two ways of sitting beside an important person: sometimes my hana'ah is that everyone is looking on and saying, "look who he's sitting with" — that is shelo lishmah; but sometimes my hana'ah is simply that I love the person and want to be with him. That is lishmah.

Olam Haba is the world of your etzem metzius. Your shayichus to that world is when what you do flows from the pashtus of your metzuis, as opposed to doing things as heichi timtza.

But – and this is an important Nekuda – Lishma is the end of the process. Mitoch shelo lishma ba lishma! This alignment comes at the end of avodah – not the beginning. And that’s why this darga is coming at the end of the Torah, not the beginning. The bechira of our parsha is not should you do mitzvos or aveiros. You’re right – if that was the whole point, then it precedes all the mitzvos. All the tzivuyim of the Torah assume a person can be borer the correct path forward. And those tzivuyim are what a person is mechuyav to do, whether he likes it or not, whether it’s your ratzon or not. But the final makeh b'patish is not a command on what we should do — but on what we should feel as our atzmius. U’vacharta B’Chayim!

…

And this is exactly the avodah of Rosh Hashanah. On Rosh Hashanah, we are mema'et almost every bakasha; but the one inyan that runs through the whole day is chayim — zochreinu l'chayim, kasveinu b'sefer hachayim. Why?

Because everything else — parnassa, refuah — are all heicha timtzas for chiyus. But on Rosh Hashanah we’re trying to be mema’et anything non-essential, and instead we try to animate our core drive for chiyus itself!

The whole year we’re involved with the olam of heichi timtza, and ovoda of shelo lishma. Even our ruchniyus-dike pursuits of ma’aseh mitzvos, for most of us, we’re still struggling at the level of lo lishma where we need incentives, and sechel-dike arguments to keep us motivated.

But on Rosh Hashana we’re asking to graduate, from shelo lishma to lishma. Where our behaviors flow from the pashut recognition that “ki heim chayeinu!” We correctly recognize our struggle to internalize ruchniyus, and beg HKBH Zachreinu l'chayim – let us touch lishma! HKBH, ha’bocher b’amo Yisroel b’ahava, see how we are bocher in You, u’vacharta b’chayim, and answer our bakashos, zachreinu l’chaim, l’ma’ancha, E-lokim Chayim!

Good Shabbos!

A Paraphrased Shiur of Rabbi Ahron Lopiansky

The parsha starts with Nedarim, and is introduced with the passuk:

זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה:

Bamidbar 30:2

Rashi brings Chazal that “Zeh Hadavar” is meyuchad to Moshe.

זה הדבר. משה נתנבא בכה אמר ה' (שמות יא, ד), והנביאים נתנבאו בכה אמר ה', מוסף עליהם משה שנתנבא בלשון זה הדבר

Rashi, Bamidbar 30:2

Moshe is different from other Nevi’im because he’s misnabeh b’Zeh while they’re only misnabeh with Koh. This is a fundamental chiluk between Moshe and other Nevi’im — so it’s strange that Chazal state it specifically here, by nedarim. You’d think it would belong in Parshas Beha’aloscha, by לא כן עבדי משה. Why mention it here by Nedarim?

And l’maaseh what is the difference between Zeh and Koh?

The Maharal explains the chiluk. He says: those inyanim where Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mechadesh davar be'olamo like a neis, an event, those can only be given with koh amar Hashem. However those inyanim that are a seder kavua be'olam, those are the things that are given with zeh hadavar.

It’s not clear what he means, and what that has to do with Zeh and Koh, and what shaychus to our parsha of Nedarim.

So let’s be masbir.

If we were asked “what’s the tachlis of avodas adam?” we’d probably say: do the mitzvos, avoid the aveiros.

Very nice, but that’s an incomplete answer. B’Emes, when HKBH created the briya, He did so with dibbur. Vayomer E-lokim, Hu Amar vayehi. However, HKBH’s dibburim actually have layers of hisgalus. Some are revealed in their final form right away. — He made a rock, and the rock simply is; His ratzon reached complete fruition. Other things Hashem placed into the world only as a dibur, a tzivui but it’s up to Adam to bring it to fruition. “gidilin taaseh lach,” and man has to go make the tzitzis. Man is born arel, and the tzivui of milah is only completed l’maaseh by the person himself. In other words, HKBH’s words come in stages, from Ratzon down to tangible reality, and adam’s tachlis is to bridge them — to bring Ratzon and Dibur down into metzius.

This is what it means that adam is called a medaber. It’s not simply that he communicates — even animals signal each other just as well as any person could. The difference is this: in the natural world — domem, tzomeach, chai —only the maaseh is real. Dibur has no metzius at all. If you said you’d build something and didn’t, that’s not a problem in their world, because only ma’aseh is viewed as real. But for Adam, dibur itself is supposed to become a metzius. Hu amar vayehi! An empty dibbur completely betrays Adam’s tzura as a m’daber!

This is why the Rabbeinu Yonah calls emes m’yesodei hanefesh. Emes is not just a nice midah, but fundamental to what a person is. Because a person whose dibur doesn’t convey a metzius, or doesn’t become a metzius, has failed in his capacity as a medaber.

This is related to the Targum on לא תוכל לאכל בשעריך – “lo suchal” the Targum renders it leis lach reshu, “you have no permission.” But that’s not what the passuk says. The passuk says “lo suchal!” You can’t do it. If HKBH says you have no permission, then for Adam that means “you can’t do it.” The d’var Hashem is a metzius.

There’s the famous Kotzker vort: when the shamash said someone stole the Rebbe’s coat, the Rebbe asked, “stole? — it says lo signov!” HKBH’s words are not empty. They’re a metzius.

Nowhere is this dibur-becoming-metzius sharper than in nedarim. Nedarim are called a hafla’ah, a word that means both “to be explicit” – like by a nazir where the hafla’ah means b’feirush – and it also means “a wonder” a pele. Both are true: a neder takes something that is not yet part of a person’s metzius — an idea, a wish, a private ratzon — and, by articulating it with specificity, it turns it into a metzius as solid as a table.

The Mishna in Chagigah speaks about different chelkei Torah. Some chelkei Torah are described as harrim hateluyim besaar, which means you have a lot of halachos, a lot of Torah she’bal peh, that are derived and rest upon very little torah she’bichsav, a mere few pesukim.

But, in contrast it says התרת נדרים פורחין באויר. Hataras nedarim have no torah she’bichsav. In other words hattaras nedarim is where the metzius and the tochen became completely disjunct. That’s what allowed for the hetter of the neder. A person’s words are supposed to have a metzius because there should’ve been a da’as behind it that gives it a metzius. התרת נדרים פורחין באויר means that that neder had nothing to be someich on. That’s why we could be mattir it – it was mechulal m’ikara.

The Gemara tells that Shimon HaTzaddik only ate the korban nazir once – it was the korban of a nezirus that came from an emes-rooted ratzon to grow — not a nezirus taken out of anger, or to prove a point, because those hargeshim don’t last, they don’t have a kiyum, and they don’t become a metzius for the person. Something not anchored in emes, not rooted in a metzius, does not have a kiyum. it’s a neder mechulal from the moment it was said because it wasn’t anchored in the person’s sense of emes.

This is why the parsha of Nedarim is where Zeh HaDavar is revealed. We mentioned the Maharal’s chiluk: passing, temporal events can only be transmitted as Koh Amar Hashem. However those inyanim that are a seder kavua be'olam, those are the things that are given with zeh hadavar.

The hesber it like we said: If something is a temporal, passing metzius, then you can’t build a solid metzius on it. It’s like trying to formulate a world-view on shifting pieces. You’ll feel the pieces only vaguely work together, but over time it’ll evolve and you’ll have no remnant of the original.

Rebbi once heard a Chassidish vertl to “quote-unquote” knock the Litvish. It says the the Chassid wants to know what Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants, and the Litvak wants to know what the Shulchan Aruch wants.

It seems like a sharp shtuch, but if anything, it’s a self-defeating shtuch. Because it may be true ,but what the Shulchan Aruch wants, everybody knows. What Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants, there’s a lot of different opinions on that. When you start with what Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants, that’s very, very tricky. That's not a tangible thing. So if you want to know the derech ha-yasharah, if you start with the Shulchan Aruch, you know that you started right.

Halachaos and Mitzvos come from zeh ha-davar. They are the fixed metzius. You can be dan and lomed and makish and mafrich and metaretz and and make chalukos, anything you want because it’s build a seder kavu’a ba’olam.

But if your starting point is Koh amar, then the binyan is pore’ach ba’avir.

That's why zeh ha-davar is nisgaleh in our parsha. Because Nedarim is the parsha where we see dibburim become a metzius. They becomes a metzius because they’re rooted in a deep hanhaga kavu’ah b’Adam. The gilluy that there's a type of nevuah called zeh ha-davar, that the devar Hashem becomes a metzius, you see it because we have a mitzvah of of nedarim.

L’ma’aseh – since we're dealing with the inyan of how things become le-ma'aseh.

The first thing is a person has to understand the only way in which machshava, ratzonos, goals, aspirations, things become a reality is if they're seen by the person as emes. If it’s just a one-time inspirational high, it won’t have a kiyum. As a person matures, he learns to discern what hergershim were just random flashes of inspiration. But if a person has tasted that hergesh again and again, then it’s more than just temporal. Then there’s a chance that it was become fixed in the person’s inner world. That is worth pursuing.

But the second take-away is Lo yacheil d’varo, k’pshuto. Doing what you said. This isn’t mesirus nefesh for a nice midah; it’s the ikar tzuras adam. If you said you’re going to do something, you do it, no matter what. It shouldn’t require a mussar shmuess with Koh Amar Hashem. It’s a metzius. It’s tzuras HaAdam!

Rebbi’s shver, zichrono livracha, who came from a very litvishe home, had almost no capacity for long mussar shmuessen about reward and punishment. When something had to be done, his entire response was: ich veis, m’muz — “It has to get done’. There was nothing more to say — the same way there’s nothing to discuss about why you can’t walk through a brick wall. Sometimes all our dibburim and meshalim, however inspiring, water down what should be an absolute metzius into just another idea to be discussed.

That’s the avodah of bein Hazmanim and Chodesh Menachem Av. We have tasks and avodos that are different from our usual seder. We have to motivate ourselves to follow thru. You don’t have to make kabbalos, but we just need to see that our avoda is not a passing, inconsistent chore. It’s not porchos ba’avir. But a revelation of a deeper value system, which will get stronger until they eventually become our metzius.

Good Shabbos!

A Paraphrased Shiur of Rabbi Ahron Lopiansky

Parshas Va'eschanan contains the first parsha of Kriyas Shema. Next week’s parsha contains the second.

However, interestingly, the Mishna in Berachos asks why does Parshas Shema precede והיה אם שמוע?

Well, isn’t the answer obvious? That’s how they chronologically appear in the the Torah! You have Shema in Va'eschanan and V'haya Im Shamoa in Eikev, so what's the problem?

Tosfos asks this question and explains that the question is prompted by the fact that we have the third Parsha, which really precedes the other two in the Torah, in Shelach, and yet it is last. So, once it's out of order, obviously it was not the order of the Torah but some other order that chazal were sensitive to.

The other major Parsha is the Aseres Hadibros, The first dibbur is Anochi, which is debated whether it's even a mitzvah or not. It's not phrased as a command. Most mitzvos are phrased with an obligation or a prohibition. Do something or don't do something. Anochi is a statement. Chazal, noticing the language doesn’t sound like a commandment, give us a mashal. They say:

משל למלך בשר ודם שנכנס למדינה.

אמר לעבדיו גזרו להם גזירות.

Amar lahem: כשיקבלו מלכותי אגזור עליהם גזירות. Once they accept my malchus, then I will tell them what to do.

שאם מלכותי אינם מקבלים גזירותיי היאך הם מקיימים?

See Berachos 13a

Now, this mashal and nimshal are very, very strange.

It's true that today's day and age people are worried about being too assertive and offending people, or even legalities, which branch of government does it belong to, do we have the authority to do this?

Those are beautiful little games that we play. However, 2,000 years ago when this was written, the dynamic was different. The generals would report to the king: “there, we've conquered, you're in charge, you're the boss, tell them what to do.” And the emperor says, well ask them if they would like me to tell them what to do. I'm not aware that any event like that ever happened in history. So what's the mashal?

And what’s the nimshal? Hakadosh Baruch Hu is telling us what to do. Yes, we do have bechira and sometimes we fulfill Hashem’s commands, and sometimes we don’t. But, regardless, it certainly doesn't depend on us checking in and asking Hakadosh Baruch Hu if we think He ought to be our melech, or not. He's telling us what to do and the consequences are clear. So what exactly is the mashal and what is the nimshal? They both present a picture that seems to be not in line with reality.

Let’s be masbir.

We have a concept of being מקבל עול מלכות שמים and being mekabel ol mitzvos.

It’s strange because in every mitzvah there's an implicit קבלת עול מלכות שמים. In other words, if a person gets up and he does a mitzva that Hashem told us to do, he is implicitly saying that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is being mitzaveh him, is he not? And if a person transgresses, he’s stating that he’s not mekabel ol malchus shomayim. So isn't the practical aspect of קבלת עול מלכות שמים already implicit in the actions that the person does or doesn't do?

This is the Gemara's question. The Gemara's question is not about the order. Lama kadma doesn't mean we need to say both of them and why is the order this way? For that, the sequence in the pesukim would be enough. Rather the Gemara's question is why do we need this introduction of saying, I proclaim HKBH king and then do His mitzvos? I you do something because I tell you, then that automatically becomes a קבלת עול מלכות שמים as well. That’s the Gemara's question.

And what did the Gemara answer?

כדי שיקבל עליו עול מלכות שמיים תחילה ואחר כך יקבל עול מצוות

Berachos 13a

What’s the Gemara’s answer?

The Gra famously said the difference between Malchus and Memshala is Memshala means a kind of rule that is bal korchach, whether you like it or not. Whereas Malchus, is only beratzon, מלכותו ברצון קיבלו עליהם.

What is this critical difference that it needs a different word? Lashon Hakodesh is not rich in synonyms – this must express an essential difference.

The teretz is that Malchus is not another form of government. A melech provides the vision, the ideal of the kingdom. It’s not just the people, the subjects, checking boxes of what they’ve been commanded. It’s people trying to realize the ideal of the Melech.

Just like in a person himself: we have an idea, an ideal that we think of and then our body and even our mind work at realizing that idea. The body and mind act cohesively to express the ideal of the person.

One of the tell-tale differences between a malchus and a moshel is whether you only care to do the letter of the law or do you care to do the spirit of the law. The subjects of the moshel have no interest in the spirit of the law.

When a moshel goes in and imposes his laws, he may get compliance, but not an interest in realizing his vision. They will do whatever it is that I force them to do. That's the point of compliance. But I can't say it's an expression of an ideal. It’s not like they have real bechira. It's an expression of not wanting to get their heads lopped off, but nothing communicating an interest in the ideal. It's an expression of nothing.

But with a Melech, the king’s subjects use their bechira to align themselves with the vision, with the ideal, and they see themselves as a vehicle for expressing that ideal that Hakadosh Baruch Hu has put into the beriah.

Let's go back to that mashal that Chazal gave us. A king comes and conquers a place. If he is a Roman emperor and his desire is just to tax the people, or oppress them, or whatever, then sure, as soon as he has the upper hand, orders go out real fast and real hard and people comply because they've just been beaten into submission. No problem with that.

But that's why the staff came into the king and the staff said, okay, they're under control, shoot. And the king said, I'm not interested in getting stuff out of this. I'm interested in building my malchus. Meaning, I want the people to buy into my vision and want to express it. Unless they buy in, then this whole city or state only is just exercising compliance. That's what the mashal is. Not a Melech.

And if you look at the words of the Chazal: שאם מלכותי אין מקבלים גזרותיי היך מקיימין. The word mekayem means to fulfill something faithfully as opposed to doing. When a person does something, he does it. Mekayem means affirm. I affirm your gezeira as your gezeira.

Just like the brain gives orders to the body and the body fulfills them accurately and exactly the way I want my body to do it, then the body is being mekayem my seichel. So that was the king. The king said, I need you to be mekayem my gezeiros and if they're not mekabel the malchus, then those gezeiros are not being miskayem.

Chazal are pointing out there’s a flow from קבלת עול מלכות שמים to Ol Mitzvos. If you'll take a closer look at the 2nd parsha of shema, the ol mitzvos seems to be about consequences. If you do it, fine. If you don't do it, terrible. Mitzvos validate themselves, even without being viewed as part of a larger ideal. Mitzvahs are good for you, aveiras are bad for you. That's how we understand the whole mitzvahs, which is fine, but that's not what Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants. Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants an Ol Malchus Shamayim from which emanates an Ol of Mitzvos.

So Chazal say we need to have the introduction to mitzvos – and that is kabbalas Ol malchus shomayim.. Hiktima doesn't mean what came first, but Hiktima means we need to precede Ol Mitzvos with Ol Malchus Shamayim because that's really the intention of Hakadosh Baruch Hu.

On a practical note, it used to be historically that many movements were people who sort of drifted away from Yiddishkeit but they would retain at least a professed belief in faith and ideals of Judaism and God. HKBH wants kindness, and chessed, and so on. But when it came to mitzvos, they shrugged and said they can't do the mitzvahs, they don't feel like doing the mitzvahs, the mitzvahs are not so relevant. They bought into the ideal, but threw out the ol mitzvos.

Today we have a phenomenon where people feel the opposite. That they're obligated to do the mitzvahs and they might fulfill them, and yet they reject the notion that there’s something loftier. It's extraordinary! The argument sounds like this: “well, I'm doing everything I'm supposed to do, what's your problem with me?” These people do but there’s no sense of HKBH’s ideal, and they also feel a lack of idealism in their Yiddishkeit.

The mitzvos are an expression of HKBH’s ideal. I am fulfilling it as a way of establishing Hakadosh Baruch Hu's vision and chochma for the world. I’m not just checking boxes! I am sensitive to ensure that my ma’asei mitzvos correctly carry, correctly convey the ideals of malchus shomayim.

Good Shabbos!

Eikev Shama B’Koli

A Paraphrased Shiur of Rabbi Ahron Lopiansky

Parshas Eikev – The Rishonim try to understand what the word Eikev means. Rashi darshens it as alluding to the mitzvos the people are “dush b’eikev.” But the Ramban tries to find a pashut pshat for the word. And in his comments he says Eikev means “because of” like we find by Avraham Avinu that HKBH said Avraham will get all the brachos עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְקֹלִי וַיִּשְׁמֹר מִשְׁמַרְתִי מִצְוֹתַי חֻקּוֹתַי וְתוֹרֹתָי. “Because of.” We need to understand the kesher between Eikev and HKBH’s brachos.

Chazal say Avraham Avinu was mekayim kol haTorah Koola when he first recognized HKBH. And they point this out in the word Eikev. הִכִּיר בּוֹרְאוֹ בֶּן שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים – three years old when he recognized HKBH – שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע. Eikev b’gematria is 172; Avraham lived 175. 175-172 = 3 years old when he recognized HKBH and started keeping kol hatorah koola. So Eikev is referring to the shpitz darga of Avraham Avinu which made him zoche to all the brachos. And it’s not referring to the older version of Avraham Avinu after he passed all 10 nisyonos – which is what you’d expect. No, instead Eikev is describing the shpitz Avraham Avinu when he first started at age three. It needs biur.

The Gra – in Aderes Eliyahu – learns that Avraham was mekayeim kol haTorah kulah, from the details in this passuk by Avraham.

עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְקֹלִי וַיִּשְׁמֹר מִשְׁמַרְתִי מִצְוֹתַי חֻקּוֹתַי וְתוֹרֹתָי

Bereishis 26:5

He explains there are arba’a chalakei haTorah: Torah she’bichsav, Torah she’ba’al peh, the drashos, and the gezeiros d’rabbanan.

1. Vayishmor mishmarti – the gezeiros of the rabbanan;

2. mitzvosai – halacha l’Moshe mi’Sinai;

3. chukosai – the drashos haTorah;

4. v’sorosai – Torah she’bichsav.

But then the Gra adds one more thing. וְעוֹד יֵשׁ חֵלֶק הִא בַּתּוֹרָה – there is a fifth chelek: the Aseres HaDibros, שֶׁהוּא כְּלַל הַכֹּל. And this is learned from the word b’koli – כִּי עֲשֶׂרֶת הַדִּבְּרוֹת שָׁמְעוּ מֵהַשֵּם עַצְמוֹ בְּקוֹלוֹ, כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתוּב קוֹל דְּבָרִים אַתֶּם שֹׁמְעִים.

So Avraham was mekayeim kol haTorah kulah from A to Z – and also he was mekayem the Aseres HaDibros? Well if he was mekayem kol hatorah koola, then of course he was mekayem the Aseres Hadibros! What is this added detail of the Aseres Hadibros?

And the Gra says the dibros are Kollel Hakol. Which b’chlal needs hesber, what exactly is so special of the Aseres HaDibros? Halachically it’s actually problematic to give deference to one chelek of Torah over others. Chazal stopped the practice of reading the Aseres Hadbros daily out of concern for over-deference to one chelek of Torah. So, we need to understand the inyan of the Aseres Hadibros as it’s own chelek of Torah, and what shaychus does it have to עקב אשר שמע אברהם בקולי ?

There’s a passuk: אַחַת דִבֶּר אֱלֹקִים שְׁתַּיִם זוֹ שָׁמָעְתִּי. When HaKadosh Baruch Hu speaks there’s one dibbur, but within the one dibbur, if a person tunes in to the dibbur, they can hear more than just one thing.

L’mashal – someone asks me, “Can I do this?” and I answer, “If you really want to.” If you listen the explicit words that he says, he’s giving you permission to do the thing. The words say yes. But the formulation of his answer and the tone, tells me a different story.

To say it differently, the dibbur gives me reshus; but the kol that carries those words says no. A dibbur is an explicit, formulated word, clearly spelled out. But a kol is the whole world of nuance that lives inside and around the word: the tone, the implication, the ratzon behind it.

In parshas Shlach it says שְׁלַח לְךָ – mida’atecha. “If you think you should, you can do it.” Mitzad the dibbur, the words, it’s a permission to send; but mitzad the kol, the nuance, it’s saying not to. The word conveys one thing; the kol speaks volumes. “Achas diber, shtayim shomati.”

However, the truth is, without the kol, there’s a nisayon that lay in just dibburim alone. When you only have dibburim, you can say there’s a finite letter of the law, but no spirit of the law. A person who is uninterested in the kol, can usually find a way to wiggle out of the dibburim. L’mashal, a tax attorney who darshens tax loopholes all day – not because he doesn’t recognize the words, but because he has no be’etzem interest in the ratzon behind them; the words are merely imposed on him, and so he wriggles between them.

This is the klal of “v’asisa hayashar v’hatov b’einei Hashem” and “Lifnim m’shuras hadin.” Like the Rishonim say, HKBH didn’t speak out rules for every single possible situation. With dibburim there are always gaps and loopholes. And the person who wants out, can find a way out. But a person who is shomeya the kol will realize the broad ratzon that includes all the unspoken cases.

And listen to Rashi on this passuk: עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְקֹלִי Rashi asks what’s koli? Rashi says “Omeid Bnisayon!” B’diyuk! A nisayon is something a person wants out of. Where there is a nisayon, my ratzon is to escape, and dibburim alone will never hold a person. אֶת בִנְךָ אֶת יְחִידְךָ אֲשֶׁר אָהַבְתָּ – Avraham could have “darshened” his way out. Chazal say he could have called it שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַמַכְחִישִׁים זֶה אֶת זֶה – etmol You told me יִצְחָק יִקָּרֵא לְךָ זָרַע, hayom You tell me farkert; the words can’t mean what they say.

But a person who is shomeia b’kol has nothing to wriggle out of. He hears not just dibburim, but also the ratzon within the kol.

Nimtza’nu lomeidim – there were two ofanim in Torah. There is the ofen of dibburim meforashim, defined and limited words and commands, and there’s the gilui of kol from which everything that’s not meforash is nilmad.

This is the progression that the Gra presented – a progression from what is most galui to what is least galui:

The things written meforash – divrei Torah – are the most galui; the dibburim suffice. The next darga is the drashos, which still have some anchor in the words but need a drash to draw out. The darga after that is halacha l’Moshe mi’Sinai – Torah she’ba’al peh that doesn’t even shtell zich tzu to a pasuk. And the furthest one out is the d’rabbanan.

That’s the nifladik pnimiyus within d’rabbanans. The Maharal says this – that d’rabbanans are not an invention from nothing. They were already tamun within the Torah.

L’mashal, mayim rishonim and mayim acharonim. Chazal hear mayim rishonim and mayim acharonim from within the words וְהִתְקַדִּשְׁתֶּם וִהְיִיתֶם קְדֹשִׁים – the Torah describes kedusha with dibburim, it simply did not give it as a geder chiyuv. The toichen is d’oraisa, the Chachamim had the ear to daher what lay within the kol.

And this is the inyan of Kol by the Aseres Hadibros. By Har Sinai it says: קוֹל דְּבָרִים אַתֶּם שֹׁמְעִים. The Rambam in the Moreh says that all of Klal Yisrael heard only kolos at Har Sinai – כִּי קוֹל אַתֶּם שֹׁמְעִים. On one hand it’s a chissaron – they needed Moshe to be omeid on the dibbur, they couldn’t do that themselves.; but on the other hand, it was a ma’alyusa – klal Yisroel’s experience was an experience of kol. The malyusa of the Aseres HaDibros is that they they were given as kol Hashem which is kolel more than any particular dibbur can. Shtayim Shomati, we hear two – because inside the single dibbur is nichlal many inyanim. Kol haTorah kulah, all the pratim and pirtei pratim and gufei halachos, are the dibburim that got nisparet out of that kol.

And this is the inyan of the kol hatorah koola that Avraham kept.עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְקֹלִי which began at ben gimmel shanim. Before he ever grasped the dibburim, before the chiluka dibburim and chiluka osiyos, he first heard the kol. The entirelty of Avraham Avinu’s gadlus was already nichlal in the shoresh, just as the entirety of the dibburim are already nichlal in the kol.

And more than that. The person can only be nisbarech if he’s a conduit for the kol, not just dibburim וְהִתְבָּרְכוּ בְזַרְעֲךָ כֹּל גּוֹיֵי הָאָרֶץ. When people see a person who is mechubar to something higher, to something which is more than meets the eye, that ushers in bracha. If a person is just following dibburim, that’s nice, that’s compliant, but an outsider doesn’t see anything beyond following directives. But when the person does more than what the dibburim call for, they detect that there’s a larger ratzon, a broader kol that this person aligns with. They see a tzinor, a hemshech of HaKadosh Baruch Hu in the world, and that is what brings bracha.

Let’s bring this down to us:

We are all overly qualified in the area of dibburim. We have Shulchan orech and Mishna Berurah which spell out the letter of the law.

But the vast majority of life is not spelled out. There are endless grey areas where there is no meforash pasak. What does a person do there? That’s where having a shaychus to the Kol is critical. Developing a kesher with HKBH’s ratzon will inform you.

L'mashal: if you ask me what a person I've never met will need, I can only tell you what seichel says — food, drink, sleep. His particular needs I cannot say because I have no glimpse into the person. But let me have one kesher with him — and if I am a baal havana, from that one interaction I can daher even things he may not have spoken. We need to push ourselves to get exposure, and be misbonen in it, and we’ll detect the unspoken kol.

And we also need to be aware of the great nisayon, the great temptation to ignore the kol and be satisfied with just checking off the boxes. As we said, if you want loopholes – and the loopholes are very tempting! – if you want loopholes, you’ll focus only on the limited dibburim, and whatever applies, I’ll comply, and whatever doesn’t, doesn’t. That kook limits you, it severely impacts your ability to hear any kol, and it blocks any bracha from flowing thru you.

V’haya Eikev tishmi’un – The brachos are poised and ready to flow to the person who is omed b’nisayon, and is not satisfied to hear only achas diber e-lokim, but is nishtokek for the kol of “shtayim zu shamati.”

Good Shabbos!

A Paraphrased Shiur of Rabbi Ahron Lopiansky

Parsha’s Re’eh -We have the parsha of tzedakah,

כִּי יִהְיֶה בְךָ אֶבְיוֹן מֵאַחַד אַחֶיךָ בְּאַחַד שְׁעָרֶיךָ

Devarim 15:7

When there’s a poor person, you have an obligation. And what is your obligation? You’d think it would say to give him tzedakka. But that’s not what the passuk says at first. It says לֹא תְאַמֵּץ אֶת לְבָבְךָ וְלֹא תִקְפֹּץ אֶת יָדְךָ מֵאָחִיךָ הָאֶבְיוֹן — you should not withhold from giving him. This needs hesber, because you'd expect the lav to come after the asseh: first פָּתֹחַ תִּפְתַּח אֶת יָדְךָ, and then lo sikpotz. Why does the Torah lead with the lo sa’aseh?

The passuk continues with

נָתוֹן תִּתֵּן לוֹ וְלֹא יֵרַע לְבָבְךָ בְּתִתְּךָ לוֹ כִּי בִּגְלַל הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה יְבָרֶכְךָ יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכָל מַעֲשֶׂךָ וּבְכֹל מִשְׁלַח יָדֶךָ:

Devarim 15:10

The Ramban in his hagahos counts “v’lo yeira l’vavcha” as a lav — even if you give, but you give without a full heart, you're over an issur. This is astonishing. Nowhere else do the hilchos lishma and middos tovos rise to the level of a lo sa'aseh. If a person takes a lulav without cheishek, or davens without kavana, he's chaser, yes — but that's a mussar shmuess, not a lav. Only here is the attitude, the middos that go into the act, counted as part of the etzem mitzvah. Why?

The Smak is masbir the issur of v'lo yeira levavcha as “im chosheiv: אם אתן יהא קרני חסרה ומוטב שלא אתן — if I give, I'll be lacking, better I shouldn't give. There’s two parts of this machshava: the second half of the machshava — "better not to give" — is clearly bad. But the first half of the machshava – that giving a hundred dollars leaves me with a hundred less — of course it does! That's simply metzius. Yes, there are havtachos of brachos — beautiful, beseder. But at the level of the etzem mitzva, how can the Torah forbid me from thinking that I'm losing money? Am I supposed to be blind to it?

Furthermore the passuk gives a reason for v'lo yeira levavcha: כִּי בִּגְלַל הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה יְבָרֶכְךָ. And Chazal say גַּלְגַּל הוּא הַחוֹזֵר בָּעוֹלָם — it’s a cycle built into the world: today a person is an ani, tomorrow an ashir. Is this the correct hashkafa? If I ask someone to help sick people and he refuses, and I answer, "It's not a tzedaka, it's health insurance — today Reuven Hacholeh benefits, but tomorrow you will" — it sounds like a veiled threat. You never know, you may want to protect yourself. So he’s not motivated by the giving, he’s motivated on how it protects him. It’s a way of purchasing aniyus insurance. Give tzedakah so that you won’t be an Ani. Is that the correct hashkafa? Where is the rachavus halev, the goodheartedness?

The passuk continues: הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן יִהְיֶה דָבָר עִם לְבָבְךָ בְלִיַּעַל. The word בְּלִיַּעַל appears only two places in the Torah — both in our parsha. One is here. The other is by the meisis u'madiach: יָצְאוּ אֲנָשִׁים בְּנֵי בְלִיַּעַל מִקִּרְבֶּךָ וַיַּדִּיחוּ. What is the common denominator? To just say "both are bad" is too vague. Where is the tzad hashaveh?

Rashi explains beliya'al as b'li ol — one who has thrown off the ol malchus shamayim. But Rabbeinu Bachya gives another peirush: beliya'al means b'li aliya. Somebody who has no aliya. And he's masbir it in a kabbalistic lashon – I’ll read the words:

שהיא מידת הדין מתוחה כנגדו. דע כי העני מחלק מידת הדין.

והעשיר שאיתו ברכה הוא מחלק מידת רחמים ודמיון השמש המאיר על הלבנה והלבנה מקבלת אורה מן השמש.

כן הנותן צדקה מאיר עיניו של עני ומקבל חסד ממנו.

And that's why the Torah was mazhir a person שיאחז במידת רחמנות שיתן מברכתו צדקה לעני.

ובעשותו זה ישתף מידת רחמים במידת הדין שהשיתוף ההוא הוא קיום העולם ואי אפשר שיתקיים בלאו ידי שניהם.

Rabbeinu Bachya, Devarim 15:9

Let's be misameik a little, because tzedaka has a shoresh that is very deep, mitzad etzem habriah itself.

Chazal say that when HKBH created the world, His initial intent was a world of din, but the world wouldn’t have a kiyum as such, so He brought the middas harachamim into the world.

The world of din and rachamim are radically different worlds. The world of din is a world of laws and boundaries, and limitations. One of the fundamental law of physics is the conservation energy. The world is a fixed, finite sum. Nothing new can come into this world, nothing can leave this world. Everything is produced at the expense of something else.

And this is also true in techunos ha’adam. A person doesn’t want to receive a matnas chinam. A person is embarrassed to take nahama d'kisufa. A person wants to feel that what he has, he earned b’din.

The world of Rachamim is very different. It’s a world beyond boundaries. It’s a world where HKBH is simply giving, kulo mashpia, no g’vul or limit to His hashpa'a. And in techunos adam, a person also wants to be a giver, as much as he can.

But obviously, we can’t have both of these. Because if the giver simply gives without the input of the recipient, then it’s nahama d’kisufa, which the recipient doesn’t want. But on the other hand, if everything is gotten b’din, then the nosein doesn’t feel like a nosein anymore. He was compelled to give b’din. There needs to be a shittuf.

Like giving to a child — if you give and give with no regard for din, you're machriv the child by making him a spoiled brat who never had to develop himself as an independent entity. But if you treat him purely as a hired worker who must pay his own room and board, that’s also machriv the child, because there’s no sense of the parent’s love – the child had to earn everything. We need a shituf where the child feels the ha’aras panim of the giver, but also senses he has developed himself. When the child does his measure, yet receives more than he put in — then you have a true shittuf of mekabel and nosen. The mekabel was mekabel partly b’din but also got more than his measure with a sense of the rachamim. and the nosen was nosen partly b’din but also more than the measure with rachamim.

The hanhagos of Din & Rachamim are most pronounced by the Ani & Ashir respectively. The ani is the metzius of din in the world — b'etzem we have nothing; nothing to give, and nothing to receive. Standing before Hakadosh Baruch Hu we are dalim v'reikim, tefilla l'ani ki ya'atof. Leis lei mi'garmei klum.

The ashir is the metzius of hashpa'a, of the yesh me'ayin of HKBH’s bracha. The ashir could’ve worked hard, but what does it mean you worked hard and therefore you have millions and millions of dollars? That's not the return on your work. The Ashir is somebody where the quantity that flows through him is be-etzem from beyond him, it’s not shayach to him.

Because the Ani is coming with nothing, dalim v’reikim, any hashpa’a that HKBH sends him is not b’din, but b’rachamim. This is the critical role the Ashir plays. The Ashir’s giving needs to accurately convey HKBH’s middas ha’rachamim. This does not mean that the ashir has to give a bli g’vul amount of tzedakah, but it does mean that the Ashir needs to convey the bli g’vul yad of HKBH.

All the questions we raised above revolve around this Nekuda:

We asked about the Smak who illustrated the issur of v'lo yeira levavcha as “im chosheiv: אם אתן יהא קרני חסרה ומוטב שלא אתן — if I give, I'll be lacking, better I shouldn't give. We noted the first half of the machshava is true! Of course, giving a hundred dollars leaves me with less. That’s the metzius. What’s wrong with that thought?

The teretz is that machshava comes from the world of din. Where there’s limitations, where anything has to come at the expenses of something else. If I give, I’m losing out. That’s a middas HaDin perspective which is the opposite of HKBH’s middas HaRachamim that has no loss or limitations. The Ashir needs to align with that even before he gives!

We also asked why does the lav of “lo sakpotz yadcha” come before the obligation to give? The teretz is exactly that – The Ashir needs to align with HKBH’s middas Ha’rachamim even before he gives! Don’t think you’ll lose out. There’s no loss or limitation that comes from HKBH’s hashpa’ah.

We asked why is v'lo yeira levavcha part of the etzem chiyuv? Everywhere else, a chisaron in kavana is not an issur. So why here? The answer is “ain Hachi nami” the kavanos are not essential to the other mitzvos, but here, even before you give, the mitzvah is for the giver to align with HKBH’s hashpa’a, and not view the giving, nor the ani, thru the lens of din. We need to accurately convey that giving comes from HKBH’s ha’aras panim, with no losses or limitations.

We also asked about biglal hadavar hazeh. Chazal say it’s a galgal ha’chozer ba'olam. Where’s the generosity in that? The answer is this cycle in the world demonstrates that your assets are not yours. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not a gazlan, chas v'shalom. If the money were intrinsically yours, b’din, He would never take it from you — אֵין הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מְקַפֵּחַ שְׂכַר כָּל בְּרִיָּה. The very fact that the roles can reverse — ani today, ashir tomorrow — is itself demonstrating that your money wasn’t yours, but rather also came thru HKBH’s hatava and hashpa’a. It’s not a veiled threat, and you’re not buying ani’us insurance. You’re reminding yourself that HKBH created roles in this world, and you’re role now is to accurately convey HKBH’s benevolence to the world.

This is the nekuda beliya'al. Bli Aliya – meaning I am prevented from seeing a higher world because of my crooked perspective. HKBH is being mashpi’a on the briya, and I prevent someone from seeing and feeling that? This is the kilkul of Avodah Zara just as it’s the kilkul in kfitzas yad. My perspective was limited, it was din, and therefore I was prevented, and I prevented others from feeling HKBH’s hashpa’a.

In Navi, we find Naval was also called bli’ya’al. When Dovid Hamelech was fleeing and begged for food, Naval answered “No way!” אֶת לַחְמִי וְאֶת מֵימַי — to give from my bread and my water!? As someone put it, Naval was the quintessential American: "I worked, I built it, it's mine — why should I give it to you?" The ashir's avoda is to be tofes his ashiros as a gift of HKBH’s hashpa’a. Yes, the X amount of crops from plowing the field are a yesh mi'yesh, — but the millions that flow through him? That is birkas Hashem, that has no claim m’din. It isn't lachmi, it isn't meimi — it’s mayim and lechem, and I am no more than a gabbai tzedaka passing it along.

…

Now let's take this into a tchum that's nogei'a to us — because none of us, to the best of my knowledge, are billionaires waiting to give out millions.

We have time. Someone makes a demand on your time. A meshulach knocks, and it irritates me, because someone is taking my time when I don't want to give it. "What right have you to intrude on my time." The tochen of tzedaka is that when the knock comes, the reaction is הנני. My job is to provide the correct sense of HKBH’s hatava in the briya. Hakadosh Baruch Hu put time into the world. Did I decide how much time I'd have? HKBH gave me the time to begin with.

Of course there are halachos — how much I must give, priorities, whether I'm learning or resting; Time isn't hefker, there's a cheshbon. But when you don’t have those cheshbonos, but you’re simply not in the mood — where’s the ha’aras panim?

The same with the person you'd rather not sit with — the lonely one who isn't terribly interesting, but for whom twenty minutes of being listened to is a whole world of belonging. It scarcely costs you a thing. What bothers you is only that someone is taking your time. But since when is it yours?

This is nogei'a in every tchum of life — anywhere our sense of possession collides with our sense of giving. For whatever it is a person is chayav to give — he does not have it. He holds it only as a shliach, to give. Whether it's time, effort, energy, or a dollar bill — that is the hargasha. And when a person lives this way, then when he himself stands at the Yemei HaDin v'Rachamim, he can legitimately claim that k’shem that he brought HKBH’s rachamim and ha’aras panim into the world, so too, may HKBH bentch him with his middah of Rachamim and ha’aras panim.

כי בגלל הדבר הזה יברכך ה

Good Shabbos!

We have a small parsha of the Beis Din Hagodol, which contains a shoreshdik havanah in Chochma, Torah, and Yiras Shomayim.

Questions:

1. The Passuk (17:8) says

   כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט בֵּין דָּם לְדָם בֵּין דִּין לְדִין וּבֵין נֶגַע לָנֶגַע דִּבְרֵי רִיבֹת בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ וְקַמְתָּ וְעָלִיתָ אֶל הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בּוֹ:

   Devarim 17:8

   When something is a Pelah, when you don’t understand it, you go to the place Hashem chose – meaning to the Beis HaMikdash where the Sanhedrin haGadol sits.

   The not-knowing is described as a Pelah – a wonder. The word Pelah is usually reserved for something that is beyond understanding, like “mafli la’asos” – how Hashem can put neshama and guf together. We see it, we can say the words, but we don’t understand it. That’s taka a wonder! But by court cases, what exactly is a Pelah? If you don’t know or understand something you just ask someone wiser, and once they explain it to you, now you understand it. What’s so “pelah-dik?” The use of Pelah seems out of place.

2. “וְקַמְתָּ וְעָלִיתָ אֶל הַמָּקוֹם” – You should go up to the “place.” Why is this described as going to a place? Aren’t you going to the Sanhedrin Hagadol? So say you’re going to the Sanhedrin Hagadol! It’s true the Sanhedrin Hagadol sits in that place, but is the place the ikkar or is the Sanhedrin the ikkar? Why is this described as going to a place?

3. Chazal explain this court case of Pelah is describing the Zaken Mamreh, a chacham defying Beis Din. The defiance, Chazal say, is a specific type of rebellion. It’s not when Beis din is saying “we have a mesorah of a” and the zaken mamreh is saying “I have a mesorah of b.” It’s not even B”D saying “we think m’svara that a” and the zaken mamreh saying “ I think m’svara that b.” Chazal say it’s a case where B”D say “we have a mesorah” and the zaken mamreh saying “I have my understanding – kach nir’eh b’eynai.” Why is this the specific form of defiance that the Torah says we need to go to the makom of the Sanhedrin Hagadol?

Answers:

The passuk says “Reishis Chochma, Yiras Hashem.” The foundation of wisdom is Yiras Hashem. Why? Why is Yiras Hashem the Reishis of Chochma?

You can say balabatish, that you need Yiras Hashem, because otherwise, all that wisdom is for naught. But to call that Reishis is not accurate. The person is still a chacham, he acquired wisdom, but unfortunately he misuses it. So yirah wasn’t needed to acquire chochma. Yirah just preserves it. That’s nice but that doesn’t seem to be Reishis, the foundation.

Another balabatish pshat – You can say it means Yiras Hashem is needed to acquire wisdom, but again, that simply puts it in the category of a prerequisite. You know, you need a lot of things in place in order to learn. You need a quiet place. You need zitsfleish. And you also need Yiras Hashem. Those may be prerequisites, but they are not Reishis.

The Havana in Reishis means the starting point that everything else is built off of and everything else gets calibrated to.

For example: When someone asks you what’s wrong with doing x? And you say “well, because it says not to do so in a passuk.” They may respond “well, what makes the passuk authoritative?” And you say “because it was given by Hashem!” They may respond “well, how do you know it was given by Hashem?” You’ll say because millions of people witnessed it. They’ll say “maybe they were all hallucinating.” Such a conversation is going nowhere, because there’s no fixed starting point that is accepted as the given where everything else is built off of and calibrated to.

In order to have some sense of knowledge, there need to be an axiomatic beginning that is immovable and everything else finds meaning by being anchored into that axiom. That’s the way of wisdom, to build a consistent worldview, which rest on a foundational point, and everything connects and extends from that foundational point. That’s is the starting point of wisdom and it also gives endurance to the wisdom.

However, once you detach from the Reishis, your chochma has nothing to stand on. If I build a whole theory based on an underlying assumption, and that assumption proves false or changes, then all the “wisdom” I constructed collapses.

Real wisdom rests on, is built upon, and is calibrated to a fixed point that exists, and cannot shift or change.

Real wisdom needs Yirah. Yirah as opposed to Ahavah. As wonderful as both of these middos are, there’s a fundamental difference between Ahavah and Yirah. With Ahava, I am the starting point – I relate to something because I want to. As opposed to Yirah, I am not the starting point. I defer to an other. Even if I don’t want to, I can’t ignore it.

For example: If you want to have a relationship with someone, there’s a difference if it’s Ahava vs yirah. If it’s Ahava, so long as you like the person, you’ll hang out with them, but once the interest fades, you’re gone. But if that person is your boss, even if your interest fades, you’re still going to do what he wants, because your metzius rests upon him.

HKBH established a world on a Reishis. In the physical world the Reishis is the makom Hamikdash where the Sanhedrin HaGadol resided. The Mikdash is on the Even Hashesiya. It’s called Even Hashesiya because “memena hushtas ha’olam” “Hushtas” meaning the rest of the world was built on and around and extends and expands from that location.

That is the location of the Sanhedrin HaGadol – for a reason. It’s not that we just needed office space for the Sanhedrin Hagadol and look! What a great, chashuvah piece of real estate, right by the Beis Hamikdash! No. The Sanhedrin Hagadol is the source of Torah for Klal Yisroel. It is the Even Shesiya of Torah for Klal Yisroel. The Sanhedrin is tapped into the Reishis of the world. They draw Torah from the bedrock, where everything gets build on and calibrated to that Reishis. The Torah that comes from that makom is the Reishis of Torah.

We asked: Are people going to the Makom or to the people in that makom? The answer is they are going to the makom – to the point of Reishis. The Sanhedrin draws its authority not from being so smart, but by their deference and connection to the makom as the Reishis. The Reishis that resides there is the level of axiomatic truth. In the level of Reishis there are no questions – it is the givens, the axioms, the starting point where everything gets calibrated to.

We asked: What’s the pelah? Once someone explains it to you, you now understand – what’s pela-dik? The answer is we’re not looking for an explanation to a hard-to-figure-out question. We’re looking for axiomatic knowledge. It’s not a question that gets answered with a svara or applications. Svara and applications come after the givens have been established. No, it’s seeking to clarify whether something has shaychus to the Reishis. Is this shayich to the source of Torah or not? It’s a pelah because it’s not going to be answered with darchei chachma, svaras and applications. We need to see it as axiomatic in the Reishis.

We asked what’s so significant about the specific form of defiance of the zaken mamreh. Remember, it’s not when Beis din saying “we have a mesorah of a” and the zaken mamreh saying “I have a mesorah of b.” It’s not even B”D saying “we think m’svara that a” and the zaken mamreh saying “ I think m’svara that b.” Chazal say it’s a case where B”D say “we have a mesorah” and the zaken mamreh saying “I have my understanding – kach nir’eh b’eynai.” We’re talking about a person who detached the hemshech from the shoresh. We have the Torah she’bal peh which is part of the Reishis. But this zaken mamreh ignores the Mesorah, ignores the Reishis and builds his own understanding “kach nireh b’eynai.” He severed the hemshech from the Reishis.

There’s no chochma when you ignore the Reishis. There’s a gemara in brachos that says this perfectly.

מרגלא בפומיה דרבא תכלית חכמה תשובה ומעשים טובים שלא יהא אדם קורא ושונה ובועט באביו ובאמו וברבו ובמי שהוא גדול ממנו בחכמה ובמנין שנאמר {תהילים קיא-י} ראשית חכמה יראת ה'

Brachos 17a

B’diyuk! Listen to Rava’s words. “He kicks aside his father and mother and Rebbi …” This is exactly the point. The father and mother and Rebbi are his Reishis, his source, and he kicks them aside to offer his unfounded, ungrounded opinion.

Let’s bring this into our worlds, because this is a dangerous tendency people struggle with. The tendency to take poetic license and say any pshat they conjure up and claim it as Torah-dik. It stems from how they relate to Torah:

Do you relate to Torah as poetry or as a metzius?

For example – when you see a work of art, or hear a song, or read poetry – if the majority of poets translate the meaning in one direction and you go in a different direction, there’s no foul. It’s a matter of taste and you had your interpretation.

But when it comes to science for example – if the majority of scientists conclude an honest study one way, and you conclude in a different direction, do you dismiss their stance as mere interpretation? Or do you second-guess yourself? You defer to them, not vis versa. If that’s the case by science, then l’havdil elef havdalos, there should be even greater deference by Torah.

Are you allowed to argue with Rishonim and Achronim? Technically, yes. And some gedolim did. But where is this coming from? Is there any loyalty, fealty to the Reishis?

You may say – “Listen, there’s 70 panim to Torah, isn’t there? I have my interpretation!” When someone has that attitude, their Yiras Hashem is suspect. Not just we suspect that this person does aveiros. It’s much deeper than that. This person has nothing keeping them honest! Anything goes!

But there’s more than that. Knowing there’s a reishis drives a person to seek that reishis. If you read a book where it’s clear the authors thoughts are baseless and whimsical, you’ll have no interest in delving deeper, because there’s nothing deeper – it’s all build on mental quicksand. However, if you know the author is a chacham, you’ll be interested in digging deeper and discovering new depths, because the depths are bringing you one step closer to the Reishis, once step closer to the real metzius.

Yehi Ratzon that we approach chochma with yirah, an emeseh Yiras Hashem that allows us to anchor ourselves into the Reishis of the briya, and may Hashem transform our “ki yipaleh” into “hareini nifla’os mi’torasecha!”

The parsha has many mitzvos. Amongst them is the issur to have false, or contradictory weights.

{יג} לֹא יִהְיֶה לְךָ בְּכִיסְךָ אֶבֶן וָאָבֶן גְּדוֹלָה וּקְטַנָּה: {יד} לֹא יִהְיֶה לְךָ בְּבֵיתְךָ אֵיפָה וְאֵיפָה גְּדוֹלָה וּקְטַנָּה:

Devarim 25:13–14

Seemingly this issur is a variation of the classic issur of theft. If you sell less than a pound of meat and you charge the customer the price of the full pound, that’s theft. However, Chazal detect a degree of severity in this issur more so than we find by classic theft.

1. Chazal say this issur is worse than arayos! Why? Because arayos a person can do teshuva, but here they cannot do teshuva.

   I don’t understand – Why can’t he do teshuva? Just give back the stuff he stole? Just like regular theft, you can do teshuva by giving back the stuff he stole. Why is this different?

   One way of understanding this is that his false weights may have been used with many people so it’s impossible to keep track of everyone affected. But that doesn’t intrinsically make it impossible to do teshuva – let’s say he only had one customer in his store the day he used his false weights. He can simply return it to that one person. On the other hand, if we have a straight-up gazlan who stole from many people, he too should seemingly not be able to do teshuva because there are too many people involved.

   So what exactly do Chazal mean that the one with false weights cannot do teshuva?

2. The Rambam explains that this issur of false weights is not just using them, but merely owning them. Even if you didn’t use them to steal, owning them is a problem. So, clearly this issur is not just a variation of theft, but something more. Let’s explain.

We use conflicting terms when speaking about HKBH. On the one hand we say HKBH is Echad, one. However, on the other hand we say HKBH has different middos, for example the 13 middos of rachamim (h’, h’, kel, rachum v’chanun). We have many different names for Hashem, corresponding to His different middos (H, E-lokim, Shakai, etc).

How can HKBH have these different middos if He is One? The answer is, that even though they are different middos, they are all designed to accomplish one goal.

For example: If you see someone who has mood swings – one moment he’s happy, another moment he’s angry, and then sad, and then pleasant. If these moods have no common goal, then you’ll either conclude he’s an unstable, moody person or he’s got multiple personalities.

However, it could be this person is a fantastic teacher, and as a teacher he realizes you need to relate to different students with different approaches in order to make the student grow. This teacher may use all the same moods we just described – happiness, anger, sadness, pleasantness – but since they are all methods used to accomplish one goal, we won’t describe this person as moody. Instead, we’d say he’s measured. He uses conscious measure of each mood to achieve his singular goal.

So, too, by HKBH. HKBH has many different hanhagos, which we describe as different middos with different names. However, all of HKBH’s middos are designed to accomplish one goal.

The one goal the all HKBH’s middos are designed for is Emes.

The chosem of HKBH is Emes. What that means is even though HKBH has many ways to express Himself, all expressions are really an expression of one singular middah – the middah of Emes.

Because HKBH has this one central middah of Emes, all other middos and hanhagos are weighed and measured against that central metric. Every hanhaga is essentially a tool of the central middah of Emes, carefully used by and measured against the central middah of Emes.

(That’s how we can say “haShaveh u’mashveh katan k’gadol.” HKBH equates the small and the big. How are they equal – One is small and the other is big? Yes, they look different, but HKBH deals with them with his singular middah of Emes – in that regard, they’re all the same middah.)

More than that.

HKBH’s middas haEmes is embedded in Tzuras Adam. Adam was created b’tzelem e-lokim, and just as chosomo shel HKBH Emes, HKBH’s central middah is Emes, so too, Adam’s central middah is Emes. Rabbeinu Yonah says Emes is the Yesod of the Nefesh.

What this means is that each person has a central middah of Emes, where everything the Adam does gets weighed and measured against a central metric.

Even in halacha, we find there are universal metrics that apply to everyone equally, but there are other metrics which are relative to each person themselves.

For example: We have Amos, and c’zayis, and 40 sa’ah, and beis cur. Those are the same metrics for everyone. But then we have personalized metrics like, malo lugmav, malo kumtzo, malo chofnav which vary from person to person.

Now, you can ask “how could we have personalized metrics, which means different metrics for different people – isn’t that a double standard, ins’t that inconsistent?” The answer is no, it’s one metric – it’s a personalized metric, that gets applied each person according to their own measure. And a personalized measure is no less Emes-dik than a universal measure.

There’s a beautiful gemara that illustrates this:

The Gemara in Shabbos tells a story about a Ger who came to both Shammai and Hillel and asked them to teach them Torah. The gemara describes Shammai pushing them away and Hillel was m’karev them with the famous line “mai d’sani l’ei lo sa’avod l’chavrei” “what you don’t like, don’t do to others.”

This gemera is classically understood as Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel l’shitasam – Beis Shammai was middas HaDin which relates more harshly to people, and beis Hillel is middas haChessed, which is warmer and more welcoming to people. It’s true, it’s l’shitasam, however, it’s not just about their middas hadin and middas hachessed, but rather how their middas hadin and middas hachessed were calibrated to their central middas haEmes.

We find Beis Shammai & Beis Hillel argue elsewhere about what was created first Shomayim or Aretz. Beis Shammai says Shomayim was created first, and Beis Hillel says Aretz was created first. What they’re saying is what is the tchila, what is the primary standard, what is the primary metric that we measure Adam against? Is it the Shomayim metric, or the Aretz metric? Shomayim metric means a universal metric should be applied to Adam. Whatever applies b’derech klal should apply to each individual. That was Beis Shammai’s position.

However Beis Hillel’s position is that Aretz is tchila, meaning we don’t use the universal metrics when measuring Adam, we use a personalized metric l’chol ish v’ish.

Back to the story of the Ger. When Shammai pushed the Ger away, the gemara says he pushed him away with “Amas HaBinyan” “A builder’s measuring stick.” What a strange detail. I didn’t know Shammai was in the construction business that he carries around a builder’s measuring stick. What is that detail doing here?

The answer is this is Shammai l’shitasam. Shammai’s middas HaEmes was Shomayim-dik, meaning we don’t approach people with a personalized measure of Emes. We use a universal metric that everyone must live up to. Whatever applies b’derech klal should apply to each individual.

However, Hillel’s approach was not based on a klaiyas-dik metric, but rather it was very personalized. “mai d’sani l’ei lo sa’avod l’chavrei” “what you don’t like, don’t do to others.” Meaning, be consistent with yourself. If you don’t like it – don’t do it to someone else! The starting point was be consistent with yourself! The Omek of Hillel’s shitta is that so long as you are consistent with yourself, from that one small emesdik starting point you can calibrate around that point and build an entire emesdik edifice. Every chelek of Torah can connect you with kol haTroah koola, so long as you are consistently applying emes. However, if you do not apply a consistent metric, if you have a double-standard, then there’s no central point for you to calibrate everything to, and you’ll end up with an edifice of nonsense where anything goes!

Let’s return to our questions:

1. We asked what do Chazal mean that the one with false weights cannot do teshuva? Why can’t he do teshuva? The answer is, if the person has one standard that he can hold himself to, then he could at least correctly identify right as right and wrong is wrong. He can recalibrate himself and get back on track. But when you have contradictory weights, that means you have different ways of measuring rights and wrongs. How can you do teshuva when you have a part of you saying “I’m not wrong?” How can you recalibrate yourself? What is going to be your point of calibration if you have two conflicting metrics?

2. We asked why owning the weights is assur, even if you didn’t use them to steal? The answer is because just having the double-standard, just having two conflicting metrics is a hashchasa of Tzuras Adam. There’s no longer a single middah of Emes governing the person. You have uprooted the Yesod of Emes in the tzuras Adam!

We are standing on the cusp of Rosh Hashana, the Yom Hadin. We envision the whole process of Din as HKBH taking out a giant Shulchan Aruch and going thru every siman and seeing if we kept every halacha.

As intimidating as that sounds, we don’t really feel fully accountable. Because these are HKBH’s standards. It’s a little unfair holding us to HKBH’s standards.

L’mashal: If you say to someone “how come you don’t give as much tzedakah as Reuven?” That’s not a tayna on the person because there may be many reasons why he’s different than Reuven – Reuven has more money, the charitable cause is more meaningful to Reuven’s family, Reuven has a more giving personality, etc. Holding them to Reuven’s standards is not a real din. The only way you can judge a person is against their own standards. Were you consistent with yourself?!

Chazal say “oy lanu m’yom hadin, oy lanu m’yom hatochacha.” The ultimate example of rebuke was Yosef to his brothers. The reason why it was so powerful is because he wasn’t comparing them to other people, but rather he used their own standards against them.

They said “How can we return to our father without his son with us?” We really care about our father, and we know he loves his son, and we can’t do this to him. Yosef’s response was “Oh really? I am Yosef, your father’s son.” Where was your compassion then? He used their own standard against them. That is Real Din, that is Real Tochacha!

Rosh Hashana is the Yom Hadin on your middas HaEmes. Were you consistent, did you have a single metric, or did you apply double-standards?

When someone spoke Lashon Hara about you, it pained you. And yet you go and speak lashon hara about someone else? HKBH doesn’t need to bring the sefer Chofetz Chaim against you. It’s your own double-standard that brings the rebuke!

You’re studying in Yeshiva. You say “ki hem Chayeinu.” You’d think you would be as diligent in Yeshiva as you are in college. Yet in college you take notes, you studied for hours, you did chazarah. Did you do the same for Talmud Torah?

On the Yom Hadin, who’s going to testify against you? Chazal say it’s not malachim, it’s not even the walls of your house, but rather “Chosem yad kola dam bo!” A person’s own signature is what damns him.

Our parsha is telling us that each person needs to hold himself accountable to himself. Tzuras Adam is not a multitude of middos but rather one central midda of emes. That is